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Abstract:  This essay reviews how three pillars of political economy, collective action, 
institutions and political market imperfections, help us answer the question:  why do some 
countries develop and others not?  Each makes tremendous advances in our understanding 
of who wins and who loses in government decision making, generally, but only a subset of 
this literature helps us answer the question.  The study of political market imperfections 
strongly suggests that the lack of credibility of pre-electoral political promises and 
incomplete voter information are especially robust in explaining development outcomes.  
From the institutional literature, the most powerful explanation of contrasting development 
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dWhat does political economy tell us about economic development – and 
vice versa?   
The problem of underdevelopment is in substantial measure one of government 
failure, and therefore political failure, in developing countries.  A vast literature has 
illuminated the role of interest groups, institutions and political market imperfections in 
shaping the actions of government.  However, there has been no systematic effort to 
establish how the political economy literature answers the question, “Why are some 
countries economically developed and others not?”  Addressing this question is the objective 
of this essay.   
Two government failures are the focus of this essay.  One is the adoption of policies 
that unnecessarily leave most people in society worse off.1  The other is the inability to make 
credible promises to refrain from opportunistic behavior.2  The first, policy inefficiency, has 
been examined using each of the three pillars of political economy analysis.  The theory of 
collective action rests on the hypothesis that organized groups of voters apply more pressure 
on politicians than unorganized groups.  This theory explains systematic policy failure in 
developing countries if special interests in poor countries are particularly well-organized and 
antagonistic to broader development objectives.   
The second pillar focuses on the institutions that structure how politicians gain and 
retain power and who can propose or must approve policy change.  This explains 
                                                 
1 “Unnecessarily” in the sense that Pareto-superior policies, policies that made some better off without making 
others worse off, could in principle have been adopted.   
2 The two failures are linked, since government credibility influences policy choice.  Governments that know 
their promises regarding the future are not credible have less incentive to undertake policies that only bear fruit 
if citizens believe government promises regarding the future.  A third significant category of government 
performance relates to redistribution and inequality.  These enter the analysis below as a puzzle, because of the 
absence of massive redistribution in highly unequal countries where the poor majority can and do vote; and as 
an explanation, because a significant literature links the failure of some countries to develop precisely to initial 
conditions of significant inequality in society.      2
development if the formal institutions of poor countries yield greater inefficiencies in policy 
making than formal institutions in rich countries.  Finally, policy distortions may be driven 
by imperfections in political markets, including the lack of voter information; the lack of 
credibility of pre-electoral political promises; the “all or nothing” nature of many political 
choices (such as the need to choose a single candidate to represent voter interests on 
multiple dimensions); and the extent of polarization in the electorate across politically 
relevant dimensions.  If these imperfections are more pronounced in less developed 
countries, they can explain differential development outcomes.   
The second government failure – the inability to make credible commitments –
handcuffs governments in numerous ways, from monetary policy to their ability to 
encourage investment.  The literature here is more recent, but tends to focus as well on the 
relative size and power of economic interests in a country, formal institutions, particularly 
the extent of political checks and balances and the voting franchise, and political market 
imperfections, particularly the inability of politicians to make credible pre-electoral promises.  
Researchers in this area, more than in any other, attempt to explain divergent experiences of 
economic development, and argue explicitly that governments in poor countries are less able 
to make credible commitments.  
This review sidesteps discussion of the determinants of policy efficiency in 
autocracies, simply because the literature on the political economy of democracies is far 
more advanced.  However, the entire debate surrounding the sources of government 
credibility implicitly contrasts autocratic forms of government, with no elections and no 
political checks and balances, with governments that exhibit these institutional features.  
Similarly, following the literature, the discussion below relies heavily on cross-country 
statistical comparisons to make the case that particular political economy features promote   3
development or not.  At the same time, in making the case that electoral systems or interest 
group characteristics in fact drive political behavior in particular ways, relatively more 
evidence is drawn from research in Latin America, where scholars have been especially active 
in linking formal institutions and political decision making.  Finally, although the discussion 
here has implications for the political economy of reform, that large and important literature 
is also not directly considered.   
The conclusion of the essay is straightforward to foreshadow.  All the strands of 
political economy analysis have dramatically improved our ability to understand the 
determinants of government decision making.  Only a subset of the literature, however, so 
far offers a convincing explanation for development.  Within the literature on institutions, 
analyses of checks and balances among political decision makers provide the most robust 
explanation.  Analyses of imperfections in political markets, particularly information and pre-
electoral credibility, offer another useful perspective to understand development.  Other 
analytical levers from the political economy literature provide less help in understanding why 
some countries are developed and others are not.   
Variations in government performance and economic development 
Countries exhibit enormous variation both with respect to their policy choices and 
their credibility.  With respect to policy efficiency, taking into account per capita income, 
average secondary school enrollment in 154 countries in 1995 varied more than 100 
percentage points from the minimum to the maximum.3  Enrollments in the top 25 percent 
of countries were more than 34 percent higher than the bottom 25 percent.  One commonly 
used measure of credibility is an indicator of the rule of law.  On a six point scale, again 
                                                 
3 That is, first ask:  what is the policy we expect given the country’s income?  Then subtract the actual policy 
from the predicted policy.  This difference or residual gives the policy of a country holding constant the effects 
of income.  A positive residual means that actual policy is better than what one might have expected on the 
basis of income; a negative difference means that actual policy is worse.    4
controlling for per capita income, the lowest scoring 25 percent of countries scored more 
than one point below the best performing quartile.  Similarly, the most corrupt quartile of 
countries was more than 1.5 points more corrupt than the least corrupt quartile, again on a 
six point scale.4  Taking policy and credibility failures together, it is not surprising that from 
1975 to 2000, income per capita in the fastest growing quartile of countries grew more than 
two percentage points per year faster than in the slowest growing quartile – a difference that, 
by the year 2000, meant that the incomes per capita in the slower growing quartile were 
more than 60 percent less than they otherwise would have been.5 
One could argue that these discrepancies, even controlling for income, are outside 
government control.  Many factors enter into school enrollments that are unrelated to 
government policy; this is even more true with respect to growth.  However, again 
controlling for income per capita, the top quartile of countries spent more than 7 percentage 
points more on education, as a fraction of total government spending, than the lowest 
spending quartile.6  It may not be surprising, therefore, that if one simply correlates growth 
across countries and asks how poor countries are doing relative to rich countries, one finds 
that divergence between the two groups is increasing (Pritchett 1997).  These differences are 
a core puzzle of the social sciences.     
Collective action:  economic interests and the shaping of government policy 
Why are some economic interests better able to impose their preferences on 
government policy than others?   Olson’s (1965) work answered this question with the 
argument that those economic interests least able to overcome collective action problems in 
                                                 
4 Income, growth and school enrollment data from the World Development Indicators.  Rule of law and corruption 
data from Political Risk Services’ International Country Risk Guide. 
5 Income and school enrollment data from the World Development Indicators.  Rule of law and corruption data 
from Political Risk Services’ International Country Risk Guide. 
6 Education spending from the World Development Indicators.   5
order to project their demands on politicians are most likely to bear the costs of political 
decision making.  The influence of a group depends not only on the economic gain or loss 
that a group might incur from government action, but also on the size of the group’s 
membership and its organizational ability.  Hardin (1982) further elaborates on this theme to 
analyze the informational and other barriers to collective action.  
The notion that economic interests matter for policy has been a mainstay of research 
into policy change in the United States.  McGuire and Ohsfeldt (1987) find that slaveholding 
voters at state-level constitutional assemblies resisted constitutional provisions that gave 
greater authority to the national government and, thereby, to the majority non-slaveholding 
northern states.  Romer and Weingast (1991) show that Congressional votes concerning the 
US savings and loan crisis were significantly determined by whether legislators’ voting 
districts – the key institutional variable – were dominated by solvent or insolvent thrift 
institutions.  In his analysis of Congressional action regarding various international financial 
crises, Broz (2002) finds that legislators from districts with many low-skilled workers were 
most likely to oppose international financial bailouts (e.g., loans to Mexico to stave off its 
default).  His research suggests that emergency responses to international crisis that appear 
driven by executive branch decision making are in fact not at all immune from the usual 
factors of legislative politics.  Finally, Kroszner and Strahan (1999) address the puzzle of a 
change in a regulatory status quo that had persisted for decades:  the prohibition against 
branch banking.  They link the sudden softening of small bank opposition to laws allowing 
large banks to set up branch banks to a technological innovation, the introduction of 
automated teller machines.   
Bates (1981) pioneered the application of collective action theory to policy outcomes 
in developing countries.  He linked agricultural policies in some countries in Africa – a mix   6
of harsh price controls on agricultural outputs administered by monopsony marketing 
boards and generous direct and indirect subsidies on imported inputs – precisely to the 
differential influence of interest groups on politicians.  In contrast to the work in American 
politics, he focused on the characteristics of the interest groups themselves.  He argued that 
these policies could be directly traced to the inability of small farmers, who used few of the 
imported inputs, to organize effectively; to the successful collective action of relatively few 
large farmers to receive input subsidies that offset the price controls; and to the need to 
subsidize food purchases of urban residents because of the relative ease with which they 
could be mobilized politically in opposition to the government.  This and other 
contributions, in both developed and developing countries, leave little doubt that organized 
interest groups have significant advantages in the making of policy.   
Research based on the theory of collective action has not often asked why some 
countries consistently pursue more welfare-enhancing policies than others, however.  Three 
possibilities nevertheless emerge from Olson’s work.  One is crisis.  Olson (1982), in Rise and 
Decline of Nations, argues that World War II upset the entire structure of interest groups in 
affected countries.  With their organizational capacity in tatters and their links to authority 
severed, entrenched special interests were no longer able to exercise a “sclerotic” effect on 
economic policy making and growth.  This book excited significant debate, admiring of the 
power of its parsimonious theory and sometimes skeptical about the historical evidence 
marshaled in support of the theory.  However, there seems to be little scope for using crisis 
to explain the difference between developing and developed countries.  Developing   7
countries are among the most upheaval-prone in the world, but within these societies it is 
actually the best-organized interest groups that seem to be most resilient.7   
Second, the sheer number of interest groups might influence their overall impact:  
multiple interest groups, competing for state attention, might offset each others’ influence.  
Experience suggests otherwise, however.  In conditions where interest groups are strong 
generally, governments tend to respond to interest group competition by arranging logrolls 
that give competing interest groups what they want at the expense of unorganized interests.  
Omnibus legislation emanating from the US Congress provides one frequent example of 
this.  Bates (1981) concludes that in the African countries he examines, all special interests 
(large farmers, urban residents) were satisfied at the expense of unorganized interests (small 
farmers).    
Finally, it might be that countries differ in the presence of well-organized groups 
with interests antagonistic to development.  This is implicit in Frieden (1991).  He explores 
the role of economic interests in the quite different responses of five Latin American 
countries to similar crises.  Two hypotheses frame the argument:  a particular economic 
sector can better influence government responses to crisis the greater is its internal cohesion; 
and a sector will invest more in exerting influence the more that it stands to gain or lose 
from policy change.   The first is familiar.  The second rests on the notion that sectors with 
assets that cannot be easily transferred to other uses – sectors with more specific assets – are 
those that have the most to gain from influencing policy.8  Bates (1983) similarly argues that 
                                                 
7 Despite the departure of the Suharto regime, the transition to democracy, and severe economic crisis, the 
former cronies of the old regime, special interests par excellence, continue to hold sway over privatization, 
deregulation and anti-corruption efforts of the country (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, “Indonesia: Endemic 
corruption overshadows reform plans,” 16 September 2003). 
8 Oliver Williamson first described the problem of asset specificity as the potential that a firm could be held up 
by a trading partner because the firm’s assets were useful only in producing goods to sell to that trading 
partner.  Frieden’s notion is somewhat different.  Assets are specific when firms cannot use their assets outside   8
the nature of production (in his case, cocoa in Ghana and cereal grains in Kenya) 
systematically influences producer incentives to act collectively or collusively. 
Firms that derive large rents from natural resources, from government-established 
barriers to entry, or that are capital-intensive, with capital equipment useful only in the 
production of particular goods, have stronger interests in mobilizing.  An important aspect 
of asset specificity is pre-existing government privileges to a sector.  If there are high rents to 
production in a particular sector because of government privileges, and those privileges are 
not transferable to other sectors, then the assets of firms in the privileged sector are highly 
specific.  However, Frieden explicitly abstains from explaining why more such privileges 
exist in some countries rather than others.   
The work of Bates and Frieden carefully charts the role of interest groups in policy 
failures of developing countries.  Their arguments are not meant to identify why the 
influence of interest groups is more pernicious in some countries than in others.  However, 
their conclusion – that the characteristics of the economic activities in which interest groups 
are engaged is a significant determinant of interest group activity – is reflected in subsequent 
research that examines the relationship between the nature of economic interests in a society 
and economic development.  Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) and Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2002) observe first that economies differ systematically in the extent to which 
economic rents can be concentrated in a few hands.  Some economies, such as those in 
many Spanish colonies in Latin America, relied on capital-intensive mineral extraction or 
plantation-style agriculture.  Rents in other areas, such as many North American British 
colonies, could only be extracted through the efforts of large numbers of colonists as they 
worked in small agricultural plots or small manufacturing endeavors.   
                                                                                                                                                 
the sector that government might regulate, independent of how many trading partners the firm has.     9
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) painstakingly demonstrate that Latin American and 
Caribbean countries based on plantation agriculture or mineral extraction generated a wide 
range of policy inefficiencies.  Their argument, and that of Acemoglu and Robinson (2002), 
is that the early comparative economic advantage of these countries lay in economic 
activities that naturally concentrated wealth in a few hands.  Political power followed 
economic power, and the politically powerful had no incentive to permit an even economic 
nor political playing field for citizens.  They imposed high barriers to entry into 
manufacturing and finance, underprovided education, and limited the electoral franchise to a 
small slice of the citizenry.  In the United States, in contrast, particularly the northern states, 
the nature of economic activity demand created a greater demand for skilled labor and the 
situation was precisely the reverse.  Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) look at similar 
facts but emphasize the second important government failure:  the inability to make credible 
promises to citizens.  This is discussed in greater detail in later sections.   
Despite different emphases, the essential point in both Engerman, et al. and 
Acemoglu, et al. (2002) is that the initial allocation of rents discourages institutional 
developments that are conducive to growth and development.9  Institutions, then, rather 
than collective action theory, are the key link in their argument from economic interests to 
economic development.  Though these researchers point to institutions such as the franchise 
and restraints on the executive, their work paints with a broad institutional brush.  This 
naturally leads one to ask which institutions matter for development.  The next section of 
this essay reviews some of the rich literature linking political and electoral institutions to 
political incentives to pursue efficient policies.   
                                                 
9 Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) make a similar argument.  The success of British colonies, 
generally (though not universally), they argue, was due to the lack of control of local elites over the colonial 
state.  Why this lack of control prevailed is precisely what Engerman, Haber and Sokoloff and Acemoglu, 
Robinson and Johnson attempt to explain.   10
The institutional links from economic interests to economic policies 
The interest group literature is persuasive that policy inefficiencies tend to emerge 
because politicians weight interest group objectives more heavily than those of the average 
citizen of a country.  Substantial progress has been made in understanding the circumstances 
under which political competitors are more likely to appeal to citizens broadly or to special 
interests narrowly.  One branch of this research has focused especially on the analysis of 
formal electoral and political institutions (e.g., parliamentary versus presidential forms of 
government).10  To the extent that formal institutions are both different in developing than 
in developed countries and can explain systematic policy failures in the first relative to the 
second, they also can provide an explanation for divergent development experiences.11   
To identify whether electoral and political institutions penalize politicians for 
pursuing special interests at the expense of the national interest, one must first establish what 
kinds of policies are generally associated with special or national interests.12  Most of the 
work comparing the policy effects of formal institutions focuses on budget policies.  Under 
this rubric, the maintained assumption in the literature is largely that narrowly targeted 
spending, with no positive spillovers to the wider population, favors special interests.  Public 
                                                 
10 The label of “political” for those institutions that govern political decision making of officials already in 
government, and of “electoral” for those institutions that govern how officials get to office, is purely for 
expository convenience.   
11 These are far from the only institutional debates in the political economy literature.  For example, one of the 
core debates in American politics concerns the driving forces of Congressional organization:  whether it is 
redistributive (matching committee membership to legislator demand for committee policies), as in Shepsle and 
Weingast (1987); informational (using committee influence to provide an incentive to legislators to become 
experts in areas of great uncertainty), as in Krehbiel (1991); or partisan (parties, rather than committees, are the 
vehicle through which legislators solve collective action problems), as in Cox and McCubbins (1993).  This 
debate, usefully summarized in Shepsle and Weingast (1994), uses policy outcomes to establish which 
underlying motivations drive congressional organization, rather than using congressional organization to 
explain changes in policy.  It therefore does not have direct implications for the institutions and development 
debate.   
12 Shleifer, et al. (2003) argue for the primacy of institutions in economic development.  However, their 
analysis concerns the difficulties societies have weaving between disorder and dictatorship.  They abstract from 
the specific incentives of political decision makers to adopt laws and economic policies that they argue 
persuasively are key to economic development.     11
good spending, or redistributional spending that benefits large segments of the population, 
do not. Other metrics for assessing whether politicians pursue the public interest or not are 
potentially preferable but are difficult to measure and test; hence, the focus in the literature 
on budgets.   
So, for example, Cox and McCubbins (2001) argue that institutions influence the 
tradeoff between policies targeted at narrow or broad constituencies, depending on whether 
institutions give candidates incentives to develop personal constituencies or parties 
incentives to splinter.  Persson and Tabellini (2000) distinguish electoral institutions in a 
slightly different way, asking whether they give politicians incentives to provide narrow or 
public goods, but also asking whether they moderate or exacerbate politician incentives to 
engage in rent-seeking.  Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) analyze a third 
permutation:  the incentives of government to provide group-specific or geographically-
targeted benefits.   
Electoral institutions  
Cox (1997) highlights three electoral institutions that influence policy tradeoffs 
between nationally- and narrowly-targeted policies.  How many votes can voters cast?  How 
large are district magnitudes?  More votes and larger magnitudes increase incentives for 
parties to splinter.  And, can voters express a preference for individual candidates?  If so, 
candidate incentives to seek personal constituencies increase, even at the expense of their 
party and its orientation toward a broader constituency.  Cross-country data confirm 
substantial variation with respect to some of these electoral institutions, and sharp 
differences between developing and developed countries. The more than 90 countries 
exhibiting competitive elections in 2000 were evenly split in their reliance on proportional 
representation or plurality electoral rules.  However, among the poorest half of these   12
countries (those with purchasing power parity - adjusted per capita incomes of less than 
$6,900), two-thirds used plurality systems.  District magnitude varies similarly:  the average 
district magnitude in poorer countries with proportional representation systems is 16, but is 
24 in richer countries.13     
Other electoral differences also matter.  Contributors to Mainwaring and Shugart 
(1997), looking at Latin American presidencies, observe that in Brazil and Argentina, 
directly-elected state governors, rather than national political leaders, select candidates.  In 
Argentina, this leads to greater internal fragmentation of parties and reduced incentives to 
focus on the national interest than one might otherwise predict on the basis of its closed list 
PR system.  It exacerbates party fragmentation in Brazil, whose open list PR system, low 
party thresholds and historically lax rules governing party alliances already promote the 
pursuit of narrow over broad interests.  Colombia prohibits parties from denying the use of 
their party label to any list of candidates.  Within one electoral district, therefore, competing 
lists can bear the same party label, again yielding greater fragmentation than would otherwise 
be the case, and therefore greater political incentives to focus on narrow rather than national 
interests.   
The ratio of voters to legislators across electoral districts also affects the ability of 
some voters to impose costs on others.  The upper legislative chambers of the Dominican 
Republic and the United States assign sparsely populated regions the same representation as 
heavily populated regions.  California, with approximately 33 million people, has the same 
number of senators (two) as each of the 24 smallest states, which together have 
approximately 36 million residents.  The Distrito Nacional of the Dominican Republic has 
                                                 
13 Elections in which there were multiple competing candidates or parties, more than one party contesting, and 
no candidate or party winning more than 75 percent of the vote.  All of the information in this paragraph is 
from the Database of Political Institutions (see Beck, et al., 2001).   13
28 percent of the electorate and one senator; the 16 smallest provinces each have one 
senator, as well, but together they have only 23 percent of the electorate.  In India, the 
largest constituency of the lower house, the Lok Sabha, has 25,000,000 voters, while the 
smallest has only 50,000.  In Canada’s lower house, on the other hand, most electoral 
districts have between 90,000 and 100,000 voters; the smallest has 27,000 and the largest 
115,000, only four times larger.  Voters in districts where this ratio is low have greater 
influence on legislation, all else equal, than voters where it is large.14  Lee (1997) shows that 
in the United States, small states receive a disproportionately large share of almost all non-
discretionary redistributive transfers, independent of need – despite the fact that the small 
state bias is only strong in the Senate.  
Empirical evidence on the economic effects of voting rules is growing.  Persson and 
Tabellini (2000) compare a majoritarian system (single member districts, party control over 
nominations, and a stylized parliamentary form of government) with a proportional system 
(single district, closed list, and party control over nominations).15  The winner-take-all rules 
in majoritarian systems forces competing political parties to focus exclusively on the swing 
(indifferent) voting constituency, leading them to promise fewer public goods (which benefit 
all constituencies) and more targeted goods (targeted exclusively at the swing constituency).  
Proportional systems extract a greater political cost from parties that attempt this strategy, 
                                                 
14 See Samuels and Snyder (2002) for a comprehensive analysis of malapportionment.  They show, for 
example, that Argentine and Brazilian malapportionment are much worse than the Dominican Republic’s.  
Some also consider the sheer number of legislators.  Bradbury and Crain (2001), for example, find that 
government spending rises with the number of legislators, but that bicameralism dampens this effect. 
15 Persson and Tabellini (2000) and co-authors have launched the most comprehensive effort in the literature 
to model and test the effects of different political and electoral institutions on public policy, particularly public 
spending.  Many examples in this review are therefore drawn from their work, but often to contrast the 
assumptions they make about institutional rules with the actual rules scholars have analyzed in the comparative 
politics literature.     14
though, because PR systems permit votes in the non-swing constituencies to influence 
control of the legislature.   
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) compare the same two voting rules, also 
assuming a stylized parliamentary form of government.  They ask how a shift from more to 
less proportional electoral rules influences government incentives to target spending on 
homogeneous but geographically dispersed groups or on heterogeneous but geographically 
concentrated groups.  Voters have no exogenous ideological predilections but have different 
preferences over geographic and non-geographically targeted goods.  Following the logic of 
the “citizen candidate” model, as in Besley and Coate (2001), voters (not parties) choose 
candidates, depending on which candidate’s preferences are more likely to yield spending 
outcomes that best match voter preferences.  Consistent with Persson and Tabellini, they 
predict more geographically-targeted spending in majoritarian systems, and more group-
targeted spending in more proportional systems.  Unlike Persson and Tabellini, they predict 
an ambiguous relationship between electoral rules and total government spending.  
Based on these analyses, one can conclude that electoral rules matter for policy but 
almost surely do not explain why some countries develop and others do not.  High vote 
thresholds provide an incentive for parties to coalesce and to prefer policies in the national 
interest relatively more.  However, they are also an effective tool to exclude political upstarts 
from challenging existing parties that fail to perform, leading to more rent-seeking.  In 
addition, countries tend to exhibit clusters of electoral institutions with offsetting effects.  
For example, low district magnitudes reduce party fragmentation, but they also encourage 
candidates to develop personal constituencies.     15
Political institutions 
Political institutions determine which politicians can set the agenda; which can veto 
proposed changes in law or regulation; and which can force other politicians to leave office 
or to seek re-election.  The stronger are the veto and agenda-setting powers of political 
decision makers with broader and more national constituencies, and the less vulnerable such 
politicians are to expulsion by the other decision makers, the more that policy will reflect 
national rather than narrow interests.   
These institutions vary substantially across countries.  The relative authority of the 
executive and legislative branches over the budget differs from country to country (see 
Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999).  In Chile and many other Latin American countries, only 
the president can propose the national budget and the legislature has tightly restricted 
amendment powers.  In the United States, in contrast, only the House of Representatives 
can originate a spending bill and the president has no powers of amendment.  The authority 
that each branch of government wields directly over the tenure of the other also varies.  
Some countries’ presidents can call new elections for the legislature (e.g., Russia), while most 
cannot.  In some countries, legislatures can bring down the government without having to 
go through new elections (e.g., in Italy); in other countries, the desire to replace a cabinet 
requires legislators to bear the risk of new legislative elections, with significant consequences 
for legislative cohesion (Huber 1996, Diermeier and Fedderson 1998).  
Presidential and parliamentary systems incorporate different bundles of institutional 
arrangements governing the assignment of veto and agenda-setting power and the control of 
the executive and legislature over each other’s electoral destinies.  At the same time, a far 
greater fraction of poorer democracies is presidential.16  The large literature distinguishing 
                                                 
16 The more than 90 countries exhibiting competitive elections in 2000 were evenly split between the two   16
parliamentary and presidential systems therefore provides a convenient way to evaluate the 
policy and development impact of these bundles.17   
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) ask how the change from a presidential to 
parliamentary form of government affects public good provision that benefits all citizens, 
narrowly targeted policy making that benefits small groups of citizens, and rent-seeking, that 
benefits policy makers themselves.  They assume that both systems employ majoritarian 
electoral rules (single member districts) and that parties enjoy complete control over 
candidate selection and policy stances.  Parliamentary systems are cabinet governments in 
which cabinet members have exclusive, all-or-nothing proposal power over their portfolios, 
where one portfolio relates to spending and the other to taxation.  Each cabinet member is 
entitled to veto the proposals of all other cabinet members.  Veto, however, leads to the 
collapse of the cabinet and the potential loss of this veto power by all cabinet members.  
Mutual veto power allows the cabinet members to make credible agreements with each 
other. 
In presidential systems, they assume that all proposal power rests with the legislature 
(the executive can make no amendments, but can only disapprove or approve the final 
package), and proposal power within the legislature is dispersed, as in the cabinet.18  
However, the committee in charge of tax proposals cannot veto the proposals of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
systems;  almost 75 percent of the poorer countries in this group were presidential.   
17 There is a lively debate about whether presidential systems are less stable or more susceptible to gridlock, 
which is not the focus of the argument here.  For contributions to this debate, see Linz and Valenzuela (1994), 
who argue against presidentialism, and Shugart and Mainwaring (1997), who suggest that the vast differences in 
the electoral rules and level of party discipline among presidential systems make sharp conclusions about the 
role of presidentialism in stability, gridlock and capricious decision making more difficult to detect.  Cheibub 
and Limongi (2002) argue as well that political instability need not be correlated with political system, in no 
small measure because they find that a core assumption that is thought to drive greater stability in 
parliamentary systems – majority control of both executive and legislature – frequently fails to hold; 22 percent 
of parliamentary regimes they examine had minority governments. 
18 They also analyze a variant, in which the president can propose the size, but not the allocation, of the 
budget, yielding the same results.   17
spending (appropriations) committee, and vice versa.  The two committees therefore have 
no capacity to make credible agreements with each other.  Proposals are rejected only if a 
majority of the legislature votes them down.   
The differences in credibility drive the different outcomes in the two systems.  
Because the tax committee in the presidential system cannot veto the spending committee’s 
proposed allocation of spending, it knows that it will have to accept a lower spending 
allocation to its own constituents than it would otherwise be able to extract.  As a 
consequence, the tax committee sets taxes very low.  This drives rent-seeking and targeted 
transfers to specific voters down to zero, but also severely reduces public good provision.  In 
parliamentary systems, though, the institutional set-up guarantees the tax minister that he 
will get a large allocation, so he proposes a high tax rate.  Public good provision, targeted 
transfers to specific groups of voters and rent-seeking are all high.   
The Persson and Tabellini analysis is the most rigorous in linking characteristics of 
presidential and parliamentary systems to policy outcomes.  However, it makes a number of 
assumptions and emphasizes a number of institutional characteristics that other analysts do 
not.  Do these differences matter?  For example, Shugart and Carey (1992) abstract from the 
separation of powers argument and argue that the key distinction between presidential and 
parliamentary systems is that voters can cast a separate vote for the “national” policy maker 
in presidential systems, while parliamentary systems compel them to bundle their votes for 
the national policy maker and the legislator in a single ballot.  Voters are therefore more 
likely to oblige legislators in parliamentary systems to pursue a broader focus in policy 
making, giving less prominence to particularistic issues.  Persson and Tabellini incorporate 
this difference in their institutional set-up, in fact, but it does not turn out to drive their 
policy results.       18
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) assume presidents can only veto spending bills 
and show that this veto power has no effect at all on final outcomes.  Shugart and Haggard  
(2001) look at 23 presidential systems and find that in seven of them presidents enjoy 
exclusive proposal power over spending legislation and the legislature confronts severe 
constraints on amending presidential proposals.   
They also assume that legislative committees in presidential systems cannot make 
credible agreements with each other.  However, legislative leadership (Cox and McCubbins 
1993) or a rules committee (Huber 1992) have been found to enforce inter-committee 
agreements.19  Huber (1992) argues that closed rules in France and the United States – the 
ability to ensure that bills out of committee are discussed by the plenary with no 
amendments permitted –  are precisely used to preserve the credibility of bargains between 
parties.   
If one modifies the postulated institutional arrangements in Persson, Roland and 
Tabellini (2000) to reflect these real-world variations, how do spending predictions change?  
Presidential agenda control generates precisely the same conclusions regarding low spending, 
as long as presidents cannot make credible promises to legislatures.  Absent credibility, 
legislators do not believe presidential promises that spending will be directed to areas of 
legislator concern; they therefore refuse to approve high taxes.   However, where the agenda-
setting spending committee prefers targeted benefits to its narrow constituency and low 
public good spending, shifting agenda-control to the president should dramatically increase 
public good spending and reduce targeted spending. 
                                                 
19 Krehbiel (1996) argues that the legislative leadership in the US House of Representatives has relatively weak 
influence over policy making, though his case concerns possible conflicts between the median voter of the 
House and the median committee voter rather than conflicts between committees.     19
If the president does not enjoy agenda control, but the legislature has solved the 
inter-legislator credibility problem, the core reason for low spending in presidential systems 
disappears.  Spending outcomes should look similar to parliamentary systems, both with 
respect to levels and allocation across public and private goods.  Indeed, analysts of Latin 
American presidential systems point to the significant use of pork as the vehicle with which 
presidents drive through their legislative agendas (Shugart and Haggard 2001).   
Parliamentary systems are also heterogeneous.  For example, there is substantial 
variation across parliamentary systems in the rules governing the vote of confidence, which 
play a crucial role in policy outcomes in the hypothesized parliamentary system.  If a vote 
against the government’s bill means the government falls, then as Diermeier and Fedderson 
(1998) argue, the ruling coalition can more aggressively target its own constituencies at the 
expense of those outside the coalition.  The premise in such models, however, is that any 
member of the ruling coalition can make an issue a confidence vote and be sure that the 
government will adhere to its results.   
Empirically, however, of the 18 OECD parliamentary democracies with votes of 
confidence that Huber (1996) considers, in only six is it written into the constitution.   
Elsewhere it is based on convention or standing orders of parliament, creating few formal 
legal obstacles to ignoring the vote of confidence.  Moreover, in every country with a vote of 
confidence procedure, it is the prime minister who must propose that a vote on a bill be a 
confidence vote (Huber 1996).  This centralizes proposal and veto power in the hands of the 
prime minister rather than of individual ministers with line portfolios.  The line ministers 
cannot make all-or-nothing offers that benefit their narrow constituencies, as in the model of 
Persson and Tabellini.  It is rather the prime minister, who presumably has broader interests   20
at heart, and would prefer less targeted public spending, as in presidential systems, rather 
than more.   
The heterogeneity of presidential and parliamentary systems, over important 
institutional dimensions (such as the agenda control of presidents, the ability of legislators 
and presidents to make credible commitments, and the binding nature of the vote of 
confidence) cloud our ability to conclude that presidential systems pursue different policies, 
which are worse for development.  It therefore follows that the mere fact that developing 
countries are more likely to have presidential forms of government is unlikely to be a key 
factor to explain slow development.   
Assessing the empirical evidence of the policy effects of legislative and political 
institutions 
A growing literature finds that presidential systems spend much less than 
parliamentary systems (Persson, Roland and Tabellini 2000).  This is a robust finding.  The 
likely explanation for it, emerging from the foregoing discussion, is that presidents are 
unable to make credible commitments to legislators about how money will be spent, making 
legislators reluctant to approve high taxes.20  There is less empirical support for the 
hypothesis that regime choice influences the allocation of government spending.  Keefer 
(2003a) finds no evidence of a systematic effect of regime type on several dimensions of 
government performance, including gross secondary school enrollment and public 
investment.  Persson and Tabellini (1999) themselves do not find strong evidence that 
broad-based spending is proportionately less and targeted spending proportionately more in 
presidential than in parliamentary systems.   
                                                 
20 This argument is more plausible than the alternative – that legislators in presidential systems cannot make 
credible agreements with each other – since legislators in fact appear to be perfectly able to make such 
agreements.     21
What explains the inconsistency that presidential systems spend less, as predicted, 
but not differently, as also predicted?  One possibility is variations in electoral institutions 
within presidential systems.  Scholars who have studied presidential countries have 
documented a strong predilection for pork (targeted spending), which the earlier theories 
predict should be greater in parliamentary systems.  This work blames pork on electoral rules 
and weak party discipline.  Ames (1995) attributes overwhelming concern for pork 
(constituency-specific projects) among Brazilian legislators to the open-list legislative system 
in place there, but finds as well that larger district magnitudes attenuate this effect, as one 
might expect (since in large districts it is more difficult for single legislators to take credit for 
projects).  The role of governors in Argentine politics obliges politicians to target state-level 
rather than national-level priorities (Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi 2000).   
Cross-country tests of the effects of electoral rules on spending allocation are more 
ambiguous, however.  Persson and Tabellini (1999) find that low district magnitudes drive 
political competitors to satisfy smaller constituencies.  As a consequence, broad public goods 
(defined as expenditures on transportation, education, and public order and safety) are lower 
in these countries.  Using similar measures of electoral institutions, Keefer (2003a) finds little 
effect on spending allocation, however, either of district magnitude or of electoral rule.  
Moreover, Milesi-Ferretti, et al. (2002), using by far the most sophisticated measures of 
proportionality, find strong evidence that more proportional systems in the OECD (which 
in the Database of Political Institutions district magnitudes of 20 in 2000, on average) generate 
higher transfers to non-geographic groups than plurality systems (with district magnitudes of 
five).  However, they do not find that geographically targeted spending is lower in more 
proportional systems, nor are they able to replicate their results for the Latin American 
sample.     22
Assessments of the effects of electoral rules on rent-seeking are similarly mixed.  
Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) marshal substantial evidence that majoritarian electoral 
rules deter corruption.  They use the Particularism database (Seddon, et al. 2003) for their 
institutional measures.  Keefer (2003a), using institutional data from the Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck, et al. 2002) and different controls, finds contrary results.  The empirical 
results mirror the inconsistencies in the theoretical arguments linking electoral rules to 
corruption.  Majoritarian systems increase corruption if political promises prior to elections 
are not credible; they reduce it if promises are credible, or if voters use elections to make 
judgments on candidate competency (that is, plurality voting rules give voters greater ability 
to influence individual candidates’ careers, hence the term “career concerns models”).   
There is little doubt that electoral institutions influence government behavior.  
However, the evidence is not clear on the direction of the effect.  Nor does the evidence 
support the claim that electoral institutions explain why politicians in developing countries 
are systematically more prone to the pursuit of policies benefiting narrow and private 
interests.   
Economic interests, institutions and the credibility of government commitments 
Together, the arguments so far reviewed make clear that the structure of interest 
groups and institutions establish “who gets what” in a society, but do not offer robust 
explanations for differences in levels of economic development. However, a significant 
literature argues that economic interests and institutions affect growth not simply because of 
their effect on policy, but because of the ability they give policy makers to make credible 
policy commitments.   
The most important of these commitments is to refrain from expropriation, direct or 
indirect, a problem placed at the center of the study of development by North (1981).    23
Ample evidence supports the weight given to this issue.  For example, a puzzle emerges in 
Bates’ work on Africa:  why did governments set expropriatory tax rates so high that farmers 
actually stopped producing?   McMillan (2001) argues that the governments studied by Bates 
could not promise not to expropriate – their horizons were too short and their incentives to 
engage in opportunistic behavior too great for farmers to believe that low tax rates, if 
imposed, would have persisted into the future.  As a consequence, governments could not 
reap gains from reducing tax rates.   
Further evidence on the point comes from year 2000 values of a widely used 
measure of the security of property rights from Political Risk Services, the “rule of law”.  It  
was nearly one standard deviation lower in countries below the median country’s income per 
capita than above it.  Keefer and Knack (1997) find that poor countries with insecure 
property rights not only fail to “catch up” to rich countries, but they fall further behind – 
they “diverge. ”  This evidence is not simply an indictment of redistributive government.  In 
fact, the correlation between the Political Risk Services Rule of Law measure and the size of 
government (where size of government is an indicator of the extent to which government 
taxes citizen assets) is significantly negative (-.35 in 1997).   
Nor should these results be taken to reflect the development impact of the 
predictability or stability of government decision making, rather than its credibility.  As 
Tsebelis (1995) argues, policy stability should be high when the set of policies that politicians 
prefer to the status quo is small, but low otherwise.  The work of Tsebelis and others precisely 
examines the stability effects of different institutional arrangements.  Credibility, though, 
refers to how reliance on politician promises today creates an incentive for politicians to 
change policy opportunistically tomorrow.  For example, US tax policy is not particularly 
predictable or stable – it changes regularly and often substantially.  However, it is credible:    24
entrepreneurs can rely on the fact that if they invest according to the dictates of the tax code 
today, the mere fact of their reliance will not trigger an opportunistic change in the tax code 
tomorrow.21   
The predictability versus credibility attributes of institutions links to a classic 
dichotomy articulated by Cox and McCubbins (2001) when they distinguish institutions 
according to whether they lead governments to be indecisive or irresolute.  The credibility 
(resoluteness) of institutions can conflict with the decisiveness of institutions in the face of 
crisis, creating ambiguity about the net effect of such institutions on development outcomes.  
Shugart and Mainwaring (1997) argue, for example, that Latin American governments 
exhibit a tendency towards gridlock.  Keefer and Knack (2002b) look at the effect of political 
checks and balances, the institutional characteristic most often associated with credibility and 
gridlock, on country credit ratings.  If decisiveness matters most to lenders, because they 
want to be sure countries will repay loans even in times of crisis, then checks and balances 
should have a negative impact on credit ratings.  If resoluteness matters most, because 
lenders also want to be sure countries honor their loan commitments, checks and balances 
should matter positively.  In fact, checks and balances significantly increase credit ratings. 
How governments achieve credibility remains an unsettled question.  Considerable 
attention has, however, been dedicated to the role of political checks and balances, which 
make it difficult for any one political actor to act unilaterally toward citizens, and the 
                                                 
21 Keefer and Stasavage (2003) present another example that makes this point.  On a single policy dimension, 
under majority rule and with all voters perfectly informed, policy is always stable at the median voter’s most 
preferred outcome.  This stable policy outcome, however, need not be credible.  The median voter could easily 
prefer a law that protects foreign investment in one period and then, once investment enters, could prefer a law 
that expropriates that investment.  If policy were credible, foreign investors would respond vigorously to the 
first period decision not to expropriate and invest heavily.  Since it is not, their investment response to the 
decision is muted or zero. 
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universal franchise and competitive elections.  It happens that these two institutional 
arrangements together encompass the most usual definitions of democracy.   
North and Weingast (1989) argue that interest rates charged to the English Crown 
following the Glorious Revolution declined because of the enhanced power of the 
Parliament to prevent the British monarch from reneging on sovereign obligations.22  
Henisz (2000) develops an indicator of the number of veto players, weighted according to 
the heterogeneity of their policy preferences, and finds that it predicts measures of property 
rights insecurity and that it is significantly related to economic growth.  This indicator 
matches closely the fragmentation of political parties in a country.  A different measure of 
checks and balances, from the Database of Political Institutions, is also a robust predictor of 
economic growth, operating on growth through its effect on the security of property rights 
(Keefer 2003b). 
A central argument in the literature on monetary economics is that non-credible 
governments, unable to commit to a promise not to implement a surprise expansion of the 
money supply, are less likely to hold down inflation.  Keefer and Stasavage (2003) 
demonstrate that checks and balances provide that credibility, constraining opportunistic 
behavior in the setting of monetary policy.  Keefer and Knack (2003) show that checks and 
balances are key to controlling credibility-related distortions in another policy area, public 
investment.  These arguments and those of North and Weingast make clear that credible 
commitment is not necessarily neutral with respect to the quality of economic policy:  
                                                 
22 Sussman and Yafeh (2002) dispute these conclusions, however, arguing that neither movements in interest 
rates nor the evolution of the volume of British government debt can be traced to the effects of the Glorious 
Revolution.  Stasavage (2003) revisits the Glorious Revolution and concludes that parliament only constrained 
opportunistic behavior by chance and gradually, when the minority of parliamentary members who favored 
honoring sovereign obligations were able to make a deal involving religious freedom with those who were less 
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without credible commitment, sound monetary policy and adequate public investment are 
more difficult to achieve. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) 
reprise the question raised by Bates’ work:  why do politicians allow inefficient policies to 
persist when they would have more resources at their disposal if they eliminated them?  
Their answer to the question focuses on the implications of elections and the franchise.  
Expansion of the franchise gives the non-elite majority the opportunity to guarantee their 
own property rights, but also to expropriate the elite.  Where initial inequality in the 
distribution of assets is high, and where the threat of rebellion is low, the elite has more to 
lose from expanding the franchise and refrains from doing so.  Where the economic well-
being of elites depends to a great extent on investment by the non-elite rather than on the 
exploitation of mineral resources or plantation agriculture, they prefer to expand the 
franchise.  In doing so, the elite makes credible their promise not to expropriate non-elites, 
securing property rights and promoting economic growth.    
Several questions suggest room for further research into the role of checks and 
balances and the universal franchise in allowing credible commitments by government.  
First, the security of property rights varies significantly across countries that exhibit political 
checks and balances.  The rule of law in half of all countries exhibiting either checks and 
balances or competitive elections in the 1990s was the same or worse as in the median 
country lacking either one or the other.23  Second, most measures of democracy do not 
exhibit a robust relationship to growth, and yet most democracy measures focus on precisely 
the extent to which countries have competitive elections, a universal franchise and, in many 
cases, restraints on the discretion of the executive (checks and balances).   
                                                 
23 The rule of law measure is from Political Risk Services’ International Country Risk Guide and the measures of 
checks and balances and competitive elections from the Database on Political Institutions.     27
Przeworski, et al. (2000) make this point emphatically with their election-based 
objective measure of democracy.  Keefer (2003b) demonstrates that checks and balances, but 
not another objective measure of competitive elections, from the Database on Political 
Institutions, nor subjective measures of democracy, from Freedom House and Polity IV, are 
significantly associated with growth.  Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin (2003) argue that the 
only systematic policy difference between democracies and non-democracies is the 
expenditures of the latter to suppress political competition. 
Third, despite adverse economic endowments, Latin American countries eventually 
did develop the institutions, especially the universal franchise, that researchers claim protect 
the property rights of non-elites rights.  Nevertheless, despite the correction of these 
institutional distortions in the 20
th century, sustained growth did not emerge.24   
Fourth, theoretical models in the literature contemplate two straightforward 
institutional alternatives (limited versus universal franchise, for example).  There are, 
however, a variety of ways in which an elite can bring the non-elite into power without 
jeopardizing the elite’s control of its own assets.  For example, allowing a popular vote for 
one legislative chamber, but not another, the system prevailing in the United States in the 
nineteenth century, gave the average citizen some ability to block special interest efforts to 
accrue excessive privileges, while giving elites a way to veto efforts to redistribute their 
wealth.25   Similarly, the military government in Chile enshrined an electoral system and a 
legacy of military senators in the constitution that together limited the ability of 
                                                 
24 Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) do argue that in highly unequal countries, where democracy leads to 
redistribution, there is a strong incentive for the rich to restore autocratic government; democracy does not 
stabilize.  However, although Latin America is highly unequal and democracy has been unstable, in only one 
country, Chile, was the suppression of an elected government related clearly to (if not fully explained by) the 
strong redistributionist tendencies of the government.   
25 The fact that these legislative institutions did not necessarily work in this way is the subject of the 
subsequent sections of the essay.     28
redistributionist political forces from controlling economic policy following the restoration 
of democratic government.  Why have more elites not tried to provide such institutional 
guarantees, accomplishing the goal of securing property rights for all but insulating the elites 
from the threat of redistribution? 
One way to resolve these puzzles is to examine the underlying imperfections in 
political markets that might distort politician incentives.  Even when the franchise is 
universal, institutional checks and balances are pervasive, and veto players have divergent 
interests, these imperfections may lead veto players to conclude that there is little electoral 
payoff to exerting effort on behalf of citizens whose rights are jeopardized by the 
government.  These same political market imperfections seem to explain systematic policy 
differences between poorer and richer countries.   
Imperfections in political markets—credibility and information as explanations for 
policy failures in developing countries 
Of the many imperfections in political markets that scholars have identified, this 
essay closes with a discussion of just two, credibility and information.  Embedded in the 
models discussed in the foregoing analyses are assumptions about the extent to which voters 
have information about candidate characteristics or performance and to which voters can 
believe the pre-electoral promises of candidates.  Lack of either makes it more difficult for 
voters to hold candidates responsible for poor performance.  Information and credibility 
imperfections encourage political actors to focus on a narrow group of constituents to the 
exclusion of all other citizens, or to ignore voters altogether.26   The impact on policy 
predictions can be significant.  Persson and Tabellini (2000) show that majoritarian electoral 
                                                 
26 Information solves an important problem in models of gridlock:  why do two veto players delay coming to 
an agreement that would make them both better off?  In Alesina and Drazen (1991)argue that delay gives both 
sides information about the other side’s willingness to tolerate crisis, and therefore a potential advantage in any 
final settlement that offsets the benefits of early agreement.   
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systems are less corrupt when promises are credible, since majoritarianism forces candidates 
to compete more fiercely with each other in the swing district.  They are more corrupt when 
promises are not credible, because they force voters to compete more fiercely with each other 
for benefits from governments.   
Imperfect information in electoral markets 
One branch of the information literature focuses on voters who are uninformed 
about candidate characteristics.  These voters’ decisions are swayed by political campaigns 
and advertisements, creating a role for special interests to purchase narrowly targeted policies 
by providing campaign finance (Baron 1994 and Grossman and Helpman 1996).  One policy 
consequence is that uninformed voters are simply less well-served by government.  In 
addition, governments accountable only to uninformed voters can be more vigorous in the 
pursuit of their own private interests.  Because uninformed voters cannot easily identify the 
effect of rent-seeking on their welfare, politicians have greater scope to extract rents 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2000).  Adserà, Boix and Payne (forthcoming) document exactly this:  
corruption is significantly higher in countries with lower newspaper circulation.  The effects 
of newspaper circulation extend similarly to the security of property rights (Keefer 2003b).  
Newspaper circulation is dramatically lower in poorer countries than in richer.   
In other approaches, voters prefer to choose the most “competent” candidate but 
are imperfectly informed about candidate competency.  Under these circumstances, officials 
bias resource allocation against those public goods whose outcomes are more noisy and 
harder to use to assess politician ability and toward those that are better signals of high 
ability (Mani and Mukand 2002).  They would, for example, favor construction over 
education.     30
Finally, evidence suggests that when voters are informed about particular policies 
they are able to extract greater resources and better performance from political agents. 
Strömberg (2001) demonstrates that between 1933 and 1935, federal assistance to low-
income households in the United States was greater in those counties where more 
households had radios and were thus more likely to be informed about government policies 
and programs. Besley and Burgess (2003) document that state governments in India are 
more responsive to declines in food production and crop flood damage via public food 
distribution and calamity relief expenditure when newspaper circulation, particularly in local 
languages, is greater.  This evidence does not inform the broader question of whether policy 
is more socially beneficial when voters are more informed, however.27   
Lack of credibility in electoral markets 
The ability of politicians to make credible pre-electoral promises also provides a 
persuasive explanation of why policy failures are more likely in some countries than in 
others.  When campaign promises are not credible –  when it costs election winners little to 
abandon them – electoral competition does little to spur politician incentives to satisfy 
constituents.  In young or poor democracies, political party development and other 
indicators of credibility in political systems are often weak.  Parties have little history and no 
identifiable positions on issues.  Individual candidates may be credible on one or two issue 
dimensions (e.g., religion), but rarely on the broad issues that define efficient government 
performance.   
Researchers have taken two approaches to the analysis of non-credibility in electoral 
politics.  In one, voters can coordinate on ex post performance standards, as in Ferejohn 
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payoffs to particular constituencies, leading them to reduce expenditures on public goods or on broad-based 
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(1986) and Persson and Tabellini (2000), and reject incumbents that fail to meet them.  
Politicians provide no targeted private goods.  They underprovide public goods and engage 
in greater rent-seeking, relative to when they are fully credible.  In the second, as in 
Robinson and Verdier (2002), voters cannot coordinate on such performance standards and 
no public goods are provided at all.  In this case, challengers are irrelevant, since they are 
never credible, and incumbent performance has no effect on voter behavior.   
Both approaches explain the poor provision of public goods in developing countries, 
including the rule of law and the security of property rights, but are at odds with another. 
They predict indifference on the party of politicians to the provision of targeted goods 
(except to voters from whose consumption candidates directly derive utility, as in Robinson 
and Verdier).  However, in most developing country democracies, politicians are intensely 
concerned about delivering targeted transfers.   
Keefer (2002b) suggests a third credibility scenario, rooted in the literature on 
clientelism that describes patron-client relationships as repeated, personalized interactions 
between patrons and clients.  Based on such interactions, politicians can make credible 
promises to some voters but not to others.  Repeated interaction constitutes a basis for 
reputation-building.  Politicians with personalized reputations with some voters can make 
credible promises to those voters, even if to no others.  In countries exhibiting “partial” 
credibility, the foundation of a politician’s credibility is not based on the policy record of 
party or politician.  Instead, voters believe the politicians who have, for example, shown 
themselves to be reliable sources of personal assistance.  These might be locally influential 
people who have helped families with loans or jobs or assistance with legal or bureaucratic 
difficulties.  In the absence of well-developed political parties or national party leaders who   32
are more broadly credible to voters, the promises of such influential people are all that voters 
can rely on in making electoral choices.28   
Partial credibility explains many of the policy outcomes observed in democracies that 
might be labeled less credible (or less developed in general).  Since the only policy promises 
that matter prior to elections are those that “clients” believe, promises of private goods to 
clients are more politically attractive than public goods that benefit both clients and non-
clients.  Promises of public works and government jobs become the currency of political 
competition at the expense of universal access to high quality education and health care.  
The former can be targeted to individuals and small groups of voters (clients).  Universal 
access is by definition not easily targeted.   Corruption or rent-seeking is also high, since it is 
unlikely that individual voters have two “patrons”; as a consequence, most voters do not 
have politicians competing for their votes.   
Keefer (2003a) documents that young democracies exhibit greater than average 
public investment (targeted infrastructure investment), less secondary school enrollment 
(non-targetable), less secure property rights and greater corruption.  This pattern can be 
explained by the greater prevalence among young democracies of partially credible political 
actors.  Young democracies are more likely to exhibit non-credible political parties and 
reliance among political competitors on clientelist promises to the small groups of voters to 
whom they can make credible promises.   
The pre-electoral credibility of politicians is useful to examine not only because it 
seems to explain many of the policy failures observed in poor countries, but because it also 
explains why so few countries have managed to sustain long periods of economic growth 
                                                 
28 Stokes (2001) and contributors attempt to use public opinion polls to evaluate simultaneously the political 
impact of citizen information and political credibility, implicitly assessing whether citizens believe candidate 
promises, whether they use past performance to judge future actions of politicians, and how economic shocks 
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and prosperity.  Reputations are fragile and difficult to develop.  For example, as Keefer 
(2002b) argues, some countries (such as Great Britain or the United States), began their 
periods of democracy and a near universal franchise with political parties that had clearly 
established differences on issues ranging from religion to land reform and trade policy.  This 
is not the experience of most countries.  Instead, most parties need to start building 
reputations after democracy has started.  For example, in the year 2000, the average age of 
political parties in half of the 96 countries in the Database of Political Institutions with 
competitive legislative and executive elections was less than 26 years.  These were 
disproportionately poor.  Unfortunately, the reputation-building process is fraught with 
multiple equilibria, many of which involve no reputation at all, or a reputation for policies 
that are probably irrelevant for development (valor in the battle for independence or 
religious righteousness).   
Conclusion 
The rich literature in political economy has vastly improved our ability to understand 
who wins and loses in the process of economic policy making.  It has clearly shown the 
absence of any necessary connection between political decision making and efficiency or 
equity objectives, and offers explanations of frequent deviations of policy from the socially 
optimal that are not rooted in policy maker error or ignorance.  Applied to developing 
countries, political economy analyses demonstrated that often catastrophic policy choices 
and living conditions do not result primarily from a shortage of resources or an oppressive 
international economic order, but rather to local political and social conditions and the 
distorted incentives with which these conditions endow government decision makers.   
Theory and evidence suggest that development is not so much influenced by 
constitutional choices such as whether governments have presidential or parliamentary   34
systems, or proportional or majoritarian electoral systems.  Elections and the universal 
franchise appear to have similarly little impact on economic development.  Instead, theory 
and evidence point to one type of institutional arrangement – elections cum political checks 
and balances – as important for growth and development.   
Even among countries exhibiting these institutional arrangements, though, the range 
of development experiences is wide.  Imperfections in electoral and political markets offer 
an explanation for this.  Both the voter information and politician credibility differ 
substantially between developed and developing countries and explain why politically-
induced development distortions are greater in some countries than others.  At the same 
time, these imperfections explain why development is difficult to achieve.  Reputation is 
difficult to build and subject to a multitude of possible adverse equilibria.  It is, then, not 
surprising that politics so rarely supports sustained development.   
Ample work remains.  Of the many open issues, one of the most basic is that we do 
not know how reputation builds, even in successful countries.  There is no analysis of the 
conditions under which politicians translate non-economic reputations (e.g., for successfully 
fighting colonial occupiers) into a reputation for pursuing growth-promoting policies.  
Evidence on the role of information in politics and development relies on newspaper 
circulation rather than direct measures of the “supply and demand” for voter information.  
The literature provides little insight as to how incomplete information affects the tradeoffs 
politicians make between public, non-targeted and private, targeted goods.  The origins of an 
informed electorate are almost entirely unknown.  All of these are relevant questions in every 
country, developed or not.  However, it is in the examination of underdevelopment that 
their importance in a complete theory of political economy has become especially clear.     35
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